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CASE COMMENTS

had failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care such as accords
with the usual standards practiced in similar localities. Maxwell
v. Howell, supra. It would appear that expert testimony would
be necessary to prove liability regardless of whether the action is
based on tort or contract. Sherlag v. Kelly, 200 Mass. 232, 86 N.E.
293 (1908); Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and
Surgeons, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 413. It would appear, therefore, to
be necessary to base a malpractice action to recover for the death
of the patient on breach of contract only in extreme cases.
Ralph Charles Dusic,Jr.

ABSTRACTS
Evidence-Burden of Proof-Alibi
At a criminal trial, the jury was instructed that: "An alibi
will not avail as a defense unless the jury are satisfied by ieliable
and credible testimony that the absence of the defendant has been
so clearly shown that it was impossible for him to have committed
the offenses . .. ." Upon conviction, D appealed. Held, reversed.
The trial court committed reversible error in charging, in effect, that
D bore the burden of proving his defense of alibi. Halko v. State,
175 A.2d 42 (Del. 1961).
When the defense of alibi is asserted, it is commonly held
that the ultimate burden of proving defendant's presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission is upon the prosecution, not upon the defendant to show that he was at another
place. 22A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 574 (1961); 1 WnARToN, CGBMINAL EvmE2cE § 23 (12th ed. 1955). However, some confusion has
arisen because some courts have treated alibi as an affirmative
defense analogous to self-defense. The better view would appear
to be that an alibi is not an affirmative defense as it does not raise
any new matter, but merely denies an essential allegation made
by the prosecution. Annot., 29 A.L.R. 1139 (1924).
The position of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has not been entirely clear. In State v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 211,
24 S.E. 561, 563 (1896), the court said: "Alibi, being strictly a
defense, must be proven by the defendant. But, the presence of
the accused being necessary to the commission of the offense, the
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burden of proving presence is first upon the state." Similar statements can be found in many West Virginia decisions. State V.
Withrow, 142 W. Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913 (1957); State v. Parsons,
90 W. Va. 307, 110 S.E. 698 (1922). The essential difficulty with
the West Virginia Court's language is that it does not clearly
differentiate between the burden of proof and the duty to go
forward with evidence. See 20 Am. Jum. EVDENCE § 154 (1939).
Certainly, the defendant must bring forth sufficient evidence to
raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to his presence,
or his defense will fail, but that does not mean that he must prove
his absence beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. Lowry, supra at
211, the West Virginia Court did say that defendant's burden of
proof only meant his duty to produce sufficient proof so as to
raise a reasonable doubt as to his presence. While the language
used in these cases is somewhat ambiguous, the effect of these
decisions is to place West Virginia, along with Delaware, in accord
with the weight of authority.
It would appear that the answer to this problem is simplified
by a general statement set forth by Wharton: "In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the
defendant may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt." 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVmENCE § 14 (12 ed.
1955).
Federal Courts-Federal Jurisdiction Cannot Be Restricted
By State Statutes
P,a citizen of California, alleged that, while driving her automobile in Newport News, Virginia, she struck an open manhole
which the city had wrongfully left unguarded. She brought an action
against the city in a federal district court which had jurisdiction
by virtue of diversity of citizenship. A Virginia statute provided
that a tort action against a city could be instituted only in a
state court established pursuant to the Constitution of Virginia.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held that the statute was valid and dismissed the case. Held,
reversed. The jurisdiction of a federal district court is fixed by
Congress and the Constitution of the United States and cannot be
limited by acts of a state legislature. Markham v. City of Newport
News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
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The district court, after considering a number of cases, concluded that the case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
controlled the principal case. The "Erie Doctrine" holds that a
federal court, sitting in effect as a court of the state, will be
governed by state law in determining the substantive rights of the
parties. Since under the "Erie Doctrine" the state could impose
conditions precedent to the enforcement of any right, it was argued
that under these circumstances Virginia made the institution of
the action in its state court a condition precedent to enforcing
the right.
Judge Haynsworth, speaking for the circuit court, carefully
pointed out that the "Erie Doctrine" does not extend to matters
of jurisdiction, or generally, to procedure. Jurisdiction in the
federal courts is determined by acts of Congress, implementing
the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be affected by
state statutes. The philosophy of the "Erie Doctrine" is that a
federal court adjudicating rights created by a state, sits as another
court of that state and should reach the same result as a state
court deciding the identical issue.
Any other conclusion would have been foreign to the broad
powers granted to Congress in the establishment of the federal
courts.

Torts-Rights of Children to Recover for a Negligent
Injury to Their Parents
Three minor children, through their next friend, brought an
action to recover damages from Ds for the negligent injury to their
father, who was still living. The trial court sustained a motion to
strike on the basis that the children had no cause of action. Held,
affirmed. A minor child has no cause of action for damages arising
out of the disability of his father caused by the negligence of
another. Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1962).
At present, the universal rule is that minor children have no
cause of action for injuries to their parent caused by the negligence of a tort-feasor. Meredith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604 (C.A.
Hawaii 1957); Turner v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 159 F. Supp.
590 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Halbergv. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 59 A.L.R.2d
445 (1957); Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 103, 330 P.2d
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1010 (1958). See generally, ANNOT., 59 A.L.R.2d 454 (1958). Even
though the rule is universal, there has been substantial agitation
by writers to permit such an action by minor children. 32 B.U.L.
REv. 82 (1952); 20 Comvmr= L.Q. 255 (1935); 2 ST. Louis U.L.J.
305 (1953); 6 VA-D. L. REv. 926 (1953).
Recovery is generally denied to minor children on one or more
of the following bases: (1) there was no such action at common
law, and any change should be made by the legislature; (2) the
damages are too uncertain to be determined by a jury; (3) granting recovery would encourage a multiplicity of actions based on a
single tort and one physical injury; and (4) the possibility that
recovery of damages by a minor would overlap with his parent's
recovery. NPossEm, TORTS § 103 (2d ed. 1955). Of these reasons,
only the multiple-recovery possibility appears to have substantial
merit. In Halberg v. Young supra, the Hawaii Court pointed out
that where the injury did not result in death the parent could
recover the full damages which he had incurred, including inability to properly support and maintain his children. Therefore a
further recovery by a child would, to that extent, duplicate the
parent's recovery.
However, it would appear that the possibility of multiple recovery and the lesser reasons given above are not the true explanation for most of the decisions, rather these reasons seem to be an
attempt by the courts to justify a policy decision. Thus the courts
are reaching an apparently reasonable conclusion in deciding, in
effect, that an action by a child of the injury party is outside of
the scope of the risk.

TriaI-Argument of Counsel-Use of a Formula Not
Based on Evidence
Is it permissible for the plaintiff's counsel to suggest to the jury
a method of determining compensation for pain and suffering
founded on a mathematical or per-diem basis? In the past several
months various courts throughout the country have had this highly
controversial issue before them. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals in a three-two decision held that the use of a per-diem
formula constituted reversible error. Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d
18 (W. Va. 1961), 64 W. VA. L. Rnv. 237 (1962). In light of the
recent comment in the Law Review, a discussion of these hold-
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ings might be beneficial in determining whether or not there is a
discernible trend in the decisions.
In Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio 1961), the Ohio Court
of Appeals disapproved the plaintiffs counsels use of a mathematical formula argument, but held that use of such argument
was not prejudicial error in that there was substantial evidence
to sustain the verdict of the jury. Although it apparently favors
the implementation of per-diem arguments, the Montana court
has taken a view similar to Ohio's in stating that: "In any event,
whether improper argument requires reversal depends upon whether prejudice has been engendered which prevents a fair trial.
Upon examination of the record, we are unable to say that any
prejudice resulted." Wyant v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 917, 920 (Mont.
1962).
While Ohio and Montana have taken a functional approach to
the problem, other courts have recently taken more definite positions. The South Carolina court held, with one dissent, that implementation of a per-diem argument was improper. Harper v.
Bolton, 124 S.E.2d 54 (So. Car. 1962). The Illinois Supreme Court,
likewise with one dissent, reached a similar result. Caley v.
Manicke, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2468 (Ill. Sup. Ct. March 23, 1962).
But, the Maryland Court of Appeals, with two dissents, held that
the use of a mathematical formula argument was permissible.
Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 177 A.2d 701 (Md. 1962).
However, the Maryland court tempered its holding somewhat by
adding that the mathematical formula argument should be accompanied by cautionary instructions to the jury that the argument is not evidence and that the jury alone must determine the
proper verdict.
The above cited cases provide little by way of novel treatment
of the issue, but merely espouse one view or the other without
a great deal of comment. Obviously, the question is still an open
one, and it appears that it will remain open. Perhaps the functional approach taken by Montana and Ohio will bank the fires
of this legal battle, but, judging by the rate at which decisions
on the question are being handed down, the end is not near.
CharlesHenry Rudolph, Jr.
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Sales-Disclaimer of Warranty in Sale in New
Motor Vehicle Held Valid in West Virginia
P recovered judgment in the Common Pleas
to a new truck resulting from an accident
resulted from the failure of a defective wheel
accident occured nine days after purchase.

Court for damages
which P claimed
on the truck. The
D, seller, gave a

written warranty that all parts of the vehicle were "free . . . from

defects in material and workmanship," limited its obligation to a
replacement of defective parts and expressly disclaimed all other
warranties. Judgment for plaintiff was set aside in the Circuit
Court. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals, Held:
affirmed, the judgement was rightly set aside. The disclaimer
provision is valid and bars recovery for damage to the truck
(alternatite holding). (The court also held the plaintiff failed to
produce evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that the accident resulted from a defect in the product sold.) Payne v. Valley
Motor Sales, Inc., 124 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1962).
In this first ruling on a written disclaimer of implied warranties, the West Virginia court has refused to follow the consumerprotection view of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) which held invalid on grounds of public
policy the disclaimer of warranty usually found in new car sales
contracts. See, comment 65 W. VA. L. REv. 351 (1962). The reasons advanced for refusing to enforce such disclaimers is the
lack of actual bargaining and conscious agreement on such terms
of sale and also upon the better position of the seller or manufacturer to bear the risks of loss. The rationale of the West Virginia position as expressed in the instant case "the recognized right
of the parties to contract and to have such contracts upheld by a
court." 124 S.E.2d at 628. The adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code in West Virginia would not change the principle of this case
but would require additional findings to reach the same result. Warranties may be disclaimed under the Code provisions, but such
disclaimers must be "conspicuous," viz., in type of a different style
or color than that of the rest of the contract. Uwotu COMmECIL
CODE §§ 2-316, 1-210(10). See Lorensen, The Uniform Commercial
Code Sales Article Compared With West Virginia Law, 64 W. VA.
L. REv. 142, 168-73 (1962). The Code rule would permit the
freedom of contract espoused by the West Virginia court while
making it more likely that the purchaser is actually aware of the
content of the contract he has made.
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